Summary
This project investigates the source of metaphysical modality, that is to say, it is concerned with the question: “In virtue of what are some facts necessary and others possible, contingent, or impossible?”.
In particular, it will focus on the systematic investigation of the relations between the two main “new actualist” theories of modality, which share the idea that modal facts can be explained by, or grounded by, more fundamental, wholly actual phenomena.
The former aims to ground modal facts in the irreducibly dispositional properties possessed by actual objects—powers, capacities, potentialities, and so on. In its simplest terms, it states that something is possible if and only if there is a (chain of) actual power(s) directed at it, and necessary if and only if there is no power to bring about the truthmaker of its negation.
The latter aims to ground modal facts upon the essences of actual objects: what must be the case follows from the nature or identity of the existing entities, and what can be the case is whatever does not clash with said natures. In its simplest terms, it states that something is necessary if it is part of the essence of everything, and possible if its negation is not contained in the essence of everything.
In recent years, each of these two theories has generated a rich and influential literature and have proved to be among the most serious candidates as sources of modality. However, their weaknesses have also started to become clear: Dispositionalism seems to have a hard time accounting for logical and mathematical necessities, while essentialism seems to struggle more in accounting for the kind of modal truths involved in the causal, dynamic, diachronic evolution of a system.
The aim of the current project is to develop an integrated theory, which incorporates elements of both theories and avoids their weaknesses
In particular, it will focus on the systematic investigation of the relations between the two main “new actualist” theories of modality, which share the idea that modal facts can be explained by, or grounded by, more fundamental, wholly actual phenomena.
The former aims to ground modal facts in the irreducibly dispositional properties possessed by actual objects—powers, capacities, potentialities, and so on. In its simplest terms, it states that something is possible if and only if there is a (chain of) actual power(s) directed at it, and necessary if and only if there is no power to bring about the truthmaker of its negation.
The latter aims to ground modal facts upon the essences of actual objects: what must be the case follows from the nature or identity of the existing entities, and what can be the case is whatever does not clash with said natures. In its simplest terms, it states that something is necessary if it is part of the essence of everything, and possible if its negation is not contained in the essence of everything.
In recent years, each of these two theories has generated a rich and influential literature and have proved to be among the most serious candidates as sources of modality. However, their weaknesses have also started to become clear: Dispositionalism seems to have a hard time accounting for logical and mathematical necessities, while essentialism seems to struggle more in accounting for the kind of modal truths involved in the causal, dynamic, diachronic evolution of a system.
The aim of the current project is to develop an integrated theory, which incorporates elements of both theories and avoids their weaknesses
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More information & hyperlinks
| Web resources: | https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/101061407 |
| Start date: | 01-09-2023 |
| End date: | 31-08-2025 |
| Total budget - Public funding: | - 173 847,00 Euro |
Cordis data
Original description
This project investigates the source of metaphysical modality, that is to say, it is concerned with the question: “In virtue of what are some facts necessary and others possible, contingent, or impossible?”.In particular, it will focus on the systematic investigation of the relations between the two main “new actualist” theories of modality, which share the idea that modal facts can be explained by, or grounded by, more fundamental, wholly actual phenomena.
The former aims to ground modal facts in the irreducibly dispositional properties possessed by actual objects—powers, capacities, potentialities, and so on. In its simplest terms, it states that something is possible if and only if there is a (chain of) actual power(s) directed at it, and necessary if and only if there is no power to bring about the truthmaker of its negation.
The latter aims to ground modal facts upon the essences of actual objects: what must be the case follows from the nature or identity of the existing entities, and what can be the case is whatever does not clash with said natures. In its simplest terms, it states that something is necessary if it is part of the essence of everything, and possible if its negation is not contained in the essence of everything.
In recent years, each of these two theories has generated a rich and influential literature and have proved to be among the most serious candidates as sources of modality. However, their weaknesses have also started to become clear: Dispositionalism seems to have a hard time accounting for logical and mathematical necessities, while essentialism seems to struggle more in accounting for the kind of modal truths involved in the causal, dynamic, diachronic evolution of a system.
The aim of the current project is to develop an integrated theory, which incorporates elements of both theories and avoids their weaknesses
Status
SIGNEDCall topic
HORIZON-MSCA-2021-PF-01-01Update Date
09-02-2023
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