Summary
Why are actual contracts and market mechanisms often simpler than our theoretical predictions? This is a central puzzle in microeconomics and, in many environments, it constrains our ability to rely on economic models. It raises further fundamental questions: What does it mean that a contract or a mechanism is simple? How to compare the simplicity of various contracts, mechanisms, and games? The proposed research program aims to address these questions and provide a new behaviorally- grounded foundation for market design, contract theory, and the analysis of simplicity. The program has three complementary parts: (i) to address the simplicity puzzle by developing a novel approach to contracting and mechanism design that takes into account perception errors; (ii) to operationalize what simplicity means and how various mechanisms, contracts, and games can be compared in terms of their simplicity; and (iii) to explore the trade-offs between simplicity and welfare-and-revenue criteria and to develop new practical market mechanisms for markets such as school choice, the assignment of medical transplants, and the auctions of commodities and government securities.
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More information & hyperlinks
| Web resources: | https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/866376 |
| Start date: | 01-07-2022 |
| End date: | 30-06-2027 |
| Total budget - Public funding: | 1 727 380,00 Euro - 1 727 380,00 Euro |
Cordis data
Original description
Why are actual contracts and market mechanisms often simpler than our theoretical predictions? This is a central puzzle in microeconomics and, in many environments, it constrains our ability to rely on economic models. It raises further fundamental questions: What does it mean that a contract or a mechanism is simple? How to compare the simplicity of various contracts, mechanisms, and games? The proposed research program aims to address these questions and provide a new behaviorally- grounded foundation for market design, contract theory, and the analysis of simplicity. The program has three complementary parts: (i) to address the simplicity puzzle by developing a novel approach to contracting and mechanism design that takes into account perception errors; (ii) to operationalize what simplicity means and how various mechanisms, contracts, and games can be compared in terms of their simplicity; and (iii) to explore the trade-offs between simplicity and welfare-and-revenue criteria and to develop new practical market mechanisms for markets such as school choice, the assignment of medical transplants, and the auctions of commodities and government securities.Status
SIGNEDCall topic
ERC-2019-COGUpdate Date
27-04-2024
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