Summary
This proposal studies price negotiations in dynamic markets. The focus is on one of the most primitive economic problems: a seller and a buyer bargain over the price of a good. Their cost and values are private information and, if they do not reach an agreement today, they may continue bargaining tomorrow.
Somewhat surprisingly, our knowledge about bargaining with two-sided asymmetric information is still quite limited. Intuitively, on the one hand, signaling forces induce the seller and the buyer to delay trade to obtain a higher share of the trade surplus. One the other hand, Coasian forces push prices down and make trade efficient. The balance between these two forces determines the efficiency of the market and how the trade surplus is shared between the seller and the buyer.
I will provide a new systematic analysis of markets with asymmetric information. Using recent developments in the characterization of robust behavior and strategic stability, I will first analyze dynamic pricing by privately informed sellers in markets with independent values. Building on the understanding of the basic bilateral bargaining problem, I will then consider related problems. In particular, in the second subproject, I will consider interdependent values and, in the third subproject, I will consider a multilateral setting with multiple sellers. Markets studied in this project will include real estate markets, markets for durable goods, markets for intermediate goods, and financial markets. The results will provide guidance to assess the effect that currently debated policies regarding privacy or confidentiality have on social welfare or market efficiency.
Somewhat surprisingly, our knowledge about bargaining with two-sided asymmetric information is still quite limited. Intuitively, on the one hand, signaling forces induce the seller and the buyer to delay trade to obtain a higher share of the trade surplus. One the other hand, Coasian forces push prices down and make trade efficient. The balance between these two forces determines the efficiency of the market and how the trade surplus is shared between the seller and the buyer.
I will provide a new systematic analysis of markets with asymmetric information. Using recent developments in the characterization of robust behavior and strategic stability, I will first analyze dynamic pricing by privately informed sellers in markets with independent values. Building on the understanding of the basic bilateral bargaining problem, I will then consider related problems. In particular, in the second subproject, I will consider interdependent values and, in the third subproject, I will consider a multilateral setting with multiple sellers. Markets studied in this project will include real estate markets, markets for durable goods, markets for intermediate goods, and financial markets. The results will provide guidance to assess the effect that currently debated policies regarding privacy or confidentiality have on social welfare or market efficiency.
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More information & hyperlinks
| Web resources: | https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/949465 |
| Start date: | 01-02-2021 |
| End date: | 31-01-2026 |
| Total budget - Public funding: | 719 596,00 Euro - 719 596,00 Euro |
Cordis data
Original description
This proposal studies price negotiations in dynamic markets. The focus is on one of the most primitive economic problems: a seller and a buyer bargain over the price of a good. Their cost and values are private information and, if they do not reach an agreement today, they may continue bargaining tomorrow.Somewhat surprisingly, our knowledge about bargaining with two-sided asymmetric information is still quite limited. Intuitively, on the one hand, signaling forces induce the seller and the buyer to delay trade to obtain a higher share of the trade surplus. One the other hand, Coasian forces push prices down and make trade efficient. The balance between these two forces determines the efficiency of the market and how the trade surplus is shared between the seller and the buyer.
I will provide a new systematic analysis of markets with asymmetric information. Using recent developments in the characterization of robust behavior and strategic stability, I will first analyze dynamic pricing by privately informed sellers in markets with independent values. Building on the understanding of the basic bilateral bargaining problem, I will then consider related problems. In particular, in the second subproject, I will consider interdependent values and, in the third subproject, I will consider a multilateral setting with multiple sellers. Markets studied in this project will include real estate markets, markets for durable goods, markets for intermediate goods, and financial markets. The results will provide guidance to assess the effect that currently debated policies regarding privacy or confidentiality have on social welfare or market efficiency.
Status
SIGNEDCall topic
ERC-2020-STGUpdate Date
27-04-2024
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