Summary
International verification through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards forms the cornerstone of global nuclear nonproliferation efforts to prevent the misuse of nuclear material and technology for military purposes. This research examines several critical junctures in the historical development of the relationship between the IAEA and the two Koreas – South Korea (ROK) and North Korea (DPRK) – to address how this international organization has evolved in its handling of nuclear proliferators. Historical paths of the IAEA with the two Koreas – the North which succeeded in developing its own bombs vs. the South which abandoned its weapons program – have been more complicated and less one-sided than what is commonly believed. South Korea became an IAEA member state in 1957 and ratified the NPT in 1975, but it maintained a clandestine nuclear weapons program throughout the 1970s. Furthermore, although South Korea’s military nuclear pursuits were halted when its president was assassinated in 1979, suspicions about its nuclear ambitions were revived when the ROK government disclosed its past nuclear activities as it signed the Additional Protocol with the IAEA in 2004. It revealed that ROK scientists separated a small amount of plutonium from irradiated uranium in 1982 and conducted some “laboratory-scale experiments” in 2000 to enrich uranium up to a higher level than what was allowed by the IAEA. The case of the DPRK with the IAEA was more dramatic, as widely known, with its withdrawal from IAEA membership in 1994 and its expulsion of IAEA inspectors. Thus, based on extensive research in the ROK, US, and IAEA archives, analysis of open-source data, and interviews with key stakeholders, this project intends to shed new light on the understudied history of the two Koreas’ challenges and contribution to the IAEA and further examine any lessons that the IAEA learned through its turbulent relationship with one successful and one failed proliferator.
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| Web resources: | https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/101155612 |
| Start date: | 01-06-2024 |
| End date: | 30-11-2026 |
| Total budget - Public funding: | - 249 301,00 Euro |
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Original description
International verification through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards forms the cornerstone of global nuclear nonproliferation efforts to prevent the misuse of nuclear material and technology for military purposes. This research examines several critical junctures in the historical development of the relationship between the IAEA and the two Koreas – South Korea (ROK) and North Korea (DPRK) – to address how this international organization has evolved in its handling of nuclear proliferators. Historical paths of the IAEA with the two Koreas – the North which succeeded in developing its own bombs vs. the South which abandoned its weapons program – have been more complicated and less one-sided than what is commonly believed. South Korea became an IAEA member state in 1957 and ratified the NPT in 1975, but it maintained a clandestine nuclear weapons program throughout the 1970s. Furthermore, although South Korea’s military nuclear pursuits were halted when its president was assassinated in 1979, suspicions about its nuclear ambitions were revived when the ROK government disclosed its past nuclear activities as it signed the Additional Protocol with the IAEA in 2004. It revealed that ROK scientists separated a small amount of plutonium from irradiated uranium in 1982 and conducted some “laboratory-scale experiments” in 2000 to enrich uranium up to a higher level than what was allowed by the IAEA. The case of the DPRK with the IAEA was more dramatic, as widely known, with its withdrawal from IAEA membership in 1994 and its expulsion of IAEA inspectors. Thus, based on extensive research in the ROK, US, and IAEA archives, analysis of open-source data, and interviews with key stakeholders, this project intends to shed new light on the understudied history of the two Koreas’ challenges and contribution to the IAEA and further examine any lessons that the IAEA learned through its turbulent relationship with one successful and one failed proliferator.Status
SIGNEDCall topic
HORIZON-MSCA-2023-PF-01-01Update Date
24-11-2024
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